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Abstract 
Certain evolutionary psychologists have argued that a massively modular cognitive architecture is the 
necessary outcome of natural selection. This argument appears to be predicated upon three core and 
questionable assumptions - 1) a Classicist Computational Theory of Mind; 2) Marr's (1982) tripartite 
explanatory project for the cognitive sciences; and 3) the view that adaptive behaviour must come under 
fairly direct cognitive control. This paper argues that, under these core assumptions, there is in fact no 
direct support for a modular architecture from an adaptationist analysis. This is because such analyses are 
always at the behavioural level and there is nothing in the behavioural data to help decide between 
possible architectures. Behavioural data can only be used to provide an extensional functional analysis and 
architectural claims are to some extent intensional. This leaves only an argument from theoretical 
cognitive science and this too is weak. The paper closes with a discussion about whether or not an 
evolutionary perspective can inform models of cognitive architecture at all and the conclusion is drawn 
that it can. Such an approach favours ground–up modelling of functions and thereby imposes a form of 
parsimony on algorithmic and architectural speculations.  
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Introduction 
As the title suggests, this paper has a clear focus upon evolutionary explanations of cognitive architecture.  
I will provide a brief outline of what I term the Santa Barbara school of evolutionary psychology 
 
1 A version of this paper was given at the Annual Conference of the Human Behaviour and Evolution 
Society, Rutgers University, USA, June 2002. 
1(henceforth SBEP). After this I shall make some comments on the general project of cognitive science and 
use them to highlight some concerns I have about SBEP and its architectural claims about modular 
organisation.  Finally I shall speculate upon the precise relationship between functional evolutionary 
analyses and models of cognition. 
Before I embark upon any of the above I intend first to give a summary of the main argument in 
order to guide the reader through the paper.  This summary will seem a little abstract at this juncture but as 
the paper progresses I hope that it will seem less so. 
As with Sociobiology, SBEP applies evolutionary explanations to behaviour and these 
explanations are grounded within conceptions of “selfish genes” (Dawkins, 1976).  However, SBEP sees a 
missing level of explanation within Sociobiology, that of the proximate psychological mechanisms that 
mediate between selfish genes and adaptive behavioural phenotypes.  The clearest statements about this 
form of evolutionary theorising have been made by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (both at the University 
of California, Santa Barbara; Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow, 1992; Cosmides and Tooby, 1994) who have 
argued that adaptive problems in our ancestors’ past will have led to the selection of cognitive abilities that 
were able to solve these problems effectively. 
The argument from SBEP can be made starker – natural selection led to the emergence of adaptive 
behaviours within Homo sapiens. Adaptive behaviours, by their very nature, are domain-specific as they 
solve a particular adaptive problem and no other (disregarding arguments from exaptation, and subsequent 
secondary adaptations for now, which are not relevant to our central concern – see Andrews, Gangestad 
and Matthews (forthcoming) for a discussion about exaptation and evolutionary psychology).  
Experimental work in SBEP supports the notion of highly specialised behavioural abilities that meet 
adaptive problems entailing a psychology that enables the regular production of these adaptive behaviours.  
SBEP further assumes that the cognitive architecture underpinning the behaviour is organised along 
similar, almost unit-similar, domain-specific lines, such that specific cognitive mechanisms deliver specific 
adaptive behaviours. 
In this paper I shall maintain the following assumptions: 
 
21. If cognition is organised in a domain-specific fashion then the only way that 
organisation could have been instantiated is through natural selection; 
2. If natural selection is true then a predominantly domain-specific cognitive architecture 
is not the only possible outcome. 
 
SBEP shares assumption 1 with me but not 2.  Indeed, advocates of SBEP believe in the converse 
assumption: 
 
3. If natural selection is true then a predominantly domain-specific architecture is the 
only outcome. 
 
I maintain that descriptions of cognitive architecture are by their very nature intensional hypotheses, as they 
are about properties of the mind.  Behavioural data is purely extensional and cannot be used to support a 
particular intensional supposition.  In other words, there is nothing in the behavioural data that can confirm 
or deny the architectural hypothesis of SBEP: it is possible that another form of architecture could produce 
the same behaviour. Later on I shall indicate some alternatives that rely on a more pressing role for 
recurrent environmental structure.  This leaves us looking for another reason to favour modular or domain-
specific architectures that would allow us to make better practical use of my first assumption.  Such reasons 
exist within the theoretical cognitive science literature and they will be discussed.  Unfortunately they are 
not conclusive and therefore do not allow us to immediately opt for assumption 1. 
This paper is not to be read as an anti-modularity paper but rather as a caution against a wholesale 
top-down approach to cognition from evolutionary psychology.  As assumption 1 will indicate, I take 
natural selection very seriously and I think it is more than reasonable to assert its truth, but as with all good 
things it should be used sparingly in order to build theory in other areas.  I shall reflect on such matters in 
the closing sections of this paper. 
 
The Empirical Case from Santa Barbara 
3Cosmides and Tooby have provided empirical support for their claims through work on the Wason 
Selection Task (WST; Cosmides 1989; Cosmides and Tooby, 1992).  The WST in its original form asks 
participants to check an abstract conditional rule of the form PQ, where four cards represent P, Q, not-P 
and not-Q.  The standard finding is that participants generally attempt verification and check the P and Q 
cards.  However, when the task was set in a narrative, that represented the potential violation of a social 
contract, with the cards representing people and potential actions, performance was significantly improved 
with participants generally attempting falsification, which is the logically correct procedure. 
This finding was used to support a number of claims.  First, it was argued that humans would be 
sensitive to cheats.  Social contracts are the stuff of group cohesion and any individual cheating threatens to 
destabilise the finely balanced economy of the group, which could be disastrous for the individuals that 
comprise that group.  However, individuals will always try to maximise their fitness and cheating can 
facilitate this.  Such Machiavellian pressures are thought to have led to highly adapted social cognitions 
within many primate groups. 
The second claim is that detecting cheats is a domain-specific adaptive problem and this will have 
led to the selection of a contentful, domain-specific cognitive faculty or set of faculties to solve it.  Within 
the psychological literature the term “modular” has been used to denote domain-specificity of function for 
any given proximate psychological faculty. As such, the subsequent claim from SBEP, that much of the 
mind has been organised in this way through natural selection, has been dubbed the Massive Modularity 
hypothesis.  “Modularity” is not a term explicitly used by Cosmides or Tooby but all of their architectural 
descriptions conform to modularity theories. 
The term “massive” has been attached to this modularity claim to emphasise an historical 
transition in thinking about modules.  In the recent psychological literature modularity dates back to Fodor 
(1983), who introduced the idea of modular organisation for peripheral, input functions. Fodor 
characterised these modules as having some of the following properties: 
 
Encapsulated – it is impossible to interfere with the inner workings of a module. 
 
Unconscious – it is difficult or impossible to reflect on the operations of module. 
 
Speedy – modules are very fast. 
 
Shallow outputs – modules provide limited output, without information about the 
4intervening steps that led to that output. 
 
Obligatory firing – modules operate reflexively, providing predetermined outputs for 
predetermined inputs regardless of the context. 
 
Ontogenetic universals – modules develop in a characteristic sequence. 
 
Localisation – modules are mediated by dedicated neural systems. 
 
Pathological universals – modules break down in characteristic fashion following insult 
to the system. 
 
Domain specificity – modules subserve a specific function, they operate in one domain. 
(Adapted from Elman et al., 1996) 
This form of modularity was proposed in order to explain empirical evidence about the functional isolation 
of input devices, such as those of the visual system.  Fodor went on to argue that higher-order cognition 
could not be modular because of its holistic properties that allow for such phenomena as abductive 
inference and analogical thinking.   As such this was a purely computational argument about mechanisms – 
modules consisted of computations that processed domain-specific inputs in a certain way; higher-order 
thinking processes were still computational but also domain-general or global (taking many inputs).  Fodor 
despaired of ever understanding the computations that determine higher-order cognition.  The assumption 
from the evolutionary perspective discussed here is that at least a significant part of higher-order cognition 
is also organised into domain-specific modules and, as such, this represents a massive proliferation of 
modules compared with Fodor’s early speculations. 
There are two possible forms of the Massive Modularity hypothesis – a weak form and a strong 
form (Samuels, 2000).  Strong massive modularity would argue that the whole of the mind is constructed of 
modules.  As Samuels makes clear this position is not explicitly defended in the literature and it would be 
hard to defend, as it would rule out some of the flexibility we see in human cognition – such as reasoning 
by analogy.  Thus there is a case for some domain generality in the mind, but also an argument from 
adaptationism for a good deal of Darwinian modularity too.  Tooby and Cosmides make this clear: 
 
What is special about the human mind is… that it proliferated “instincts” – that is content-specific problem-
solving specializations – which allowed an expanding role for psychological mechanisms that are (relatively) 
more function-general.  These are presently lumped into categories with unilluminating labels such as “the 
capacity for culture,” “intelligence,” “learning,” and “rationality.”  It is time for the social sciences to turn from 
5a nearly exclusive focus on these embedded, more function-general mechanisms to a wider view that includes 
the crucial, and largely neglected, superstructure of evolved functional specializations.  Equally, we need to 
explore how the two classes of mechanisms are interwoven so that their combined interactive product is the 
zoologically unique yet evolutionarily patterned breadth of functional behaviours. (pp. 113 – 114) 
 
Here we see an explicit claim for evolved content-specific cognitive organisation being served by fairly 
domain-general computations.  Given the presence of some domain-generality we can only see this position 
as weak massive modularity. 
There is a potential confusion that could arise from reading the above quotation from Tooby and 
Cosmides.  It has briefly been noted that Fodor’s original work argued for computational modules that 
operated on specific inputs.  Tooby and Cosmides have stated, in this quotation, that modules are to be seen 
as content-specific, not computationally specific, which is a different idea.   Samuels, Stich and Tremoulet 
(1999) have also defined Fodorian modules as computational, and they contrast them with “Chomskyan" 
modules, which are a domain-specific set of representations. This conception arose from Chomsky’s 
notion of a language faculty instantiating innately specified grammatical principles.  Samuels et al. note 
that various developmentalists have also posited Chomskyan modules for systems of principles of physics, 
psychology and mathematics (see for example Carey and Spelke, 1994).  The modules of Carey and Spelke 
are theory-like, but Samuels et al. point out that Chomskyan modules need not be theory-like (i.e. truth 
evaluable) but could for instance be “how to” systems of representations that demand no evaluation. 
At this juncture it looks as if SBEP is arguing for a weak Massive Modularity hypothesis where 
modules are to be seen as content-specific (or Chomskyan), their content being established through natural 
selection and computed by some domain-general mechanisms.  In the above quotation from Tooby and 
Cosmides it is noteworthy that they qualify the notion of function-general mechanisms with the term 
“relatively”, thereby implying some restrictions on the operation of these processes.  Elsewhere in the same 
paper they make more forceful claims about the nature of the computations that operate over the 
Chomskyan architecture. 
 
General mechanisms turn out to be very weak and cannot unassisted perform at least most and perhaps all of the 
tasks humans routinely perform and need to perform.  Our ability to perform most of the environmentally 
6engaged, richly contingent activities that we do depends on the guiding presence of a large number of highly 
specialized psychological mechanisms…  Far from constraining, specialized mechanisms enable competences 
and actions that would not be possible were they absent from the architecture.  This rich array of cognitive 
specializations can be likened to a computer program with millions of lines of code and hundreds or thousands 
of functionally specialized subroutines.  (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992: 39) 
 
Here Tooby and Cosmides have clearly made an argument for computational specialization that is not at 
odds with a Fodorian view of modularity, and one that does not rely upon content-specific bodies of 
knowledge, as in a Chomskyan architecture.  None the less, this description is still compatible with a weak 
Massive Modularity hypothesis. 
What are we to think about SBEP and the massive modularity hypothesis?  A harsh critic would 
claim confusion for the position but a more charitable one would argue that SBEP proposes weak massive 
modularity, whereby modules are to be seen as content-specific and computationally-specific.  In keeping 
with a weak version, there is also room for some domain-general computations that would allow for the 
global properties of cognition that concerned Fodor (1983).  The rest of this paper will assume the more 
charitable reading. 
 
Behavioural Data 
The claims that SBEP makes for modularity are based on behavioural data.  The work on the WST 
demonstrated a particular facilitation effect that was domain-specific.  Humans appear to have an ability to 
perform conditional reasoning well for a social problem but not an abstract one.  The principal assumption 
of the WST work is that the logic of the abstract and social version of the task is the same; however, Fodor 
(2000) has recently taken issue with this.  Fodor uses two examples, one of a rule from an abstract version 
of the task, and one from a social version.  The abstract rule example is "if a card has a vowel on one side 
then it has an even number on the other" and is of the form PIQ.  The social rule example is "it's required 
that if someone is under 18 (s)he drinks coke".  According to Fodor this is a deontic form of the task.  The 
social contract that is represented is one of legal age limits for alcohol consumption.  However, if we want 
a coke rule that is of the form PIQ, then we would be better writing it as "if someone is under 18 (s)he is 
drinking coke" (this is an indicative conditional version).  The addition of phrases such as "it's required 
7that" changes the logic from one of a conditional PIQ to one "where all that P does is determine on whom 
the prohibition falls" (Fodor, 2000: 30). 
Fodor's argument then is that the performance differences noted by Cosmides and Tooby on the 
WST are due to differences in the tests.  This behavioural difference is not evidence of a special cheat-
detection mechanism but instead it is, at best, evidence of subjects using different "inferential paths".  
Fodor does not think that the fact that we find deontic conditional reasoning easier than indicative 
conditional reasoning is in want of an evolutionary explanation.  He thinks that these material differences 
are sufficient explanation. 
Fodor’s (2000) point is a purely logical point about the validity of the experimental assumptions.  
It has some bite with regard to SBEP, as the WST work is the principal experiment supporting the whole 
modular view of an evolved cognitive architecture.  The motivation for experiments within the cognitive 
sciences must be to explain, at the very best, or clarify the nature of, at the very least, a specific, regularly 
observed behaviour.  In the case of the Wason work the initial phenomenon was the poor performance on 
the abstract indicative conditional version of the task.  Cosmides’ and Tooby’s insight was to theorise about 
possible evolutionary explanations for the emergence of reasoning and to suggest that this might explain 
any biases observed.  In short, it could be that we are only good at certain forms of reasoning because they 
were critical to life in the evolutionary past.  The subsequent experiments do indeed seem to have 
uncovered a possible bias in favour of either social reasoning or, perhaps more precisely, deontic reasoning, 
and this has to be of interest in light of the very least aim of experiments within the cognitive sciences. 
 
SBEP and Cognitive Science 
If we leave Fodor (2000) to one side and assume that the WST findings are robust and that the materials 
well matched, we must now ask whether or not domain-specific behavioural differences are necessarily 
underlain by a similar cognitive architecture.  In order to answer this we need to look at the view of 
cognition that is at work in SBEP. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 75; Cosmides and Tooby, 1992: 178) make explicit reference to 
Marr’s (1982) tripartite explanatory framework for the cognitive sciences.  According to this view in order 
to have a full explanation of cognition we need to provide: 
81. A functional decomposition that asks what the function of the particular cognition is 
2. An algorithmic characterisation that hypothesises a formal procedure that can produce the 
function described in level 1 
3. A physical implementation that realises the algorithm in the neural substrate 
 
Marr’s framework has been influential within the cognitive sciences and SBEP aims to provide a functional 
decomposition based on the adaptive function of a variety of cognitions. 
The cognitive sciences have been dominated by the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) and 
naturally a Marrian perspective has been brought to bear upon the CTM.  CTM states that the mind is a 
computer, a physical symbol manipulator, consisting of a set of syntactically structured representations that 
are subject to formal procedures, or algorithms operating serially over them in a localised fashion (see 
Fodor 2000).  Algorithms are intensional definitions of computable functions, recipes for producing a 
specified input-output relation.  Turing introduced the notion of using a universal computer to run any 
number of different algorithms and, given the coupling between algorithm and computation, effectively 
implementing a number of different sub-machines within one piece of hardware.  CTM sees the brain as an 
idealised Turing Machine.  The hypothesis that our minds consist of functionally specialized subroutines, 
shaped by natural selection, that is referred to by Tooby and Cosmides in the quotation on p X is an 
example of this view. 
Marr argued that a higher level of explanation was independent of those below it, such that 
information about function and algorithm could not be informed by neuroscience.  Functional 
decomposition provides an extensional definition of what the function is; the algorithmic level has to 
specify how that function is produced.  A universal Turing Machine can run any algorithm so individuated.  
Despite this higher-level independence claim, Marr (1982: 27) argued that, “an algorithm is likely to be 
understood more readily by understanding the nature of the problem being solved than by examining the 
mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is embodied.”  But this is seen to be a question of determining 
the algorithm’s goal, not as a belief that functional information can specify the exact algorithm.  Given 
Turing computability, there are an infinite number of possible algorithms that could do the job. 
9Under this conception any behaviour that a cognitive system produces can be implemented in 
numerous ways, such that the behaviour itself cannot help to differentiate between hypotheses about 
algorithms. 
Not all theorists agree with Marr’s independence claim.  Churchland and Sejnowski (1992) have 
argued that the neural hardware is not a uniform substrate but has many different levels of organisation 
from molecular structure through synaptic structure to neurones and beyond.  All of these physical 
differences might act to constrain the kinds of computable functions possible within the brain.  But, as 
Kennair (2002: 25) has recently pointed out: 
 
Cosmides and Tooby … argue against the idea that empirical findings of “low-level” neuroscience “will place 
strong constraints on theory formation at the cognitive level”.  They doubt that the properties of 
neurophysiology will lead to the discovery of cognitive programs, due to the fact that “[t]he same basic neural 
tissue embodies all of these programs”.
Kennair goes on to outline SBEP’s commitment to evolutionarily based functional decomposition as a 
route to delimiting the number of possible algorithms that might compute a given function.  Indeed, 
Kennair makes it clear that this claim is of the strong form that suitable evolutionary functional 
decomposition can leave us with an empirically testable set of alternative algorithms.  Kennair sees this as a 
result of limits on functionality set by natural selection – i.e. a result of a finite number of adaptive 
problems.   
It would appear that SBEP is committed to CTM and, if Kennair is correct, the Marrian project in 
its pure form.  None the less, looking at Cosmides’ and Tooby’s (1992) treatment of the classic Prisoner’s 
Dilemma work on reciprocity (see below), what they produce is a set of design features that any putative 
algorithms would have to satisfy.  This is quite different from producing an actual algorithm to perform 
reciprocal analyses.  Indeed, it amounts to no more than a finessed functional decomposition, which is 
useful but again could be implemented by a vast number of different algorithms. 
 
SBEP’s Architectural Claims 
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Architectural claims about modularity are of a different order from claims about possible algorithms.  
Algorithms can be seen as functionally specific organisational elements of a computer but modularity refers 
to the organisation of representations, computations, or both, into “packages” that deal with a specific 
domain.  So, the computational notion of modularity is about a set of algorithms, or sub-computers, 
devoted to a specific (adaptive) function.  This overall function is likely to consist of a number of sub-
functions, each of which could be serviced by a specific algorithm.  It might seem that there is little space 
between the concept of modularity and the concept of algorithms – both being about functionally 
specialized computation.  Why not look at behavioural data of the sort produced by the WST work and 
simply argue for specific social reasoning algorithms?  What does modularity add to our understanding? 
The notion of modularity has also arisen in the Artificial Intelligence literature in response to a 
specific problem that serial computational machines face.  This is sometimes referred to as the frame 
problem, which is the problem of how a cognitive system can know which representation to access when 
confronted by a problem space that demands action. 
Dennett (1992) neatly describes the number of assumptions that an Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
machine would require for solving a relatively simple problem such as making a midnight snack.  These 
assumptions include knowledge about what is in the fridge, what ingredients can be successfully combined, 
what tools one needs to construct a meal, the fact that the physics of the universe allows food to be carried 
on a plate etc.  The amount of assumptions that need to be ruled in and ruled out of consideration soon 
appear intractable after a few minutes’ thought – although we know that it is tractable as we have all made 
midnight snacks successfully and, importantly, without much time spent considering what to do. 
The frame problem is problematic for AI because any intelligent machine that is built to operate 
even in a very small toy domain has to be able to compute the relevant information successfully.  Dennett 
offers a second example of a robot that has to save its own battery from a room with a time bomb in it.  The 
first generation robot goes to the room, sees the battery on a wagon and pulls it out of the room.  
Unfortunately the bomb is on the wagon too and it explodes.  It is at this point that the AI team realise they 
need a robot that does more than simply remove the battery from its location: it must weigh up the 
consequences of its actions.  A second generation is developed, but this goes the way of its forebear 
because it spends too long weighing up all the potential consequences and non-consequences of its possible 
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actions.  For instance it might go through “thoughts” about the effect that removing the battery on the 
wagon will have on the football results next week.  When it realises this will have no effect, the timer on 
the bomb reaches zero and the game is over. 
The robots above fail because they are machines that search a vast space serially.  The 
consequence of such local computation is that it is time-consuming when dealing with such spaces.  One 
possible solution is to program the robot with domains, or specialised frames of reference, that reduce the 
amount of searching through representations by zeroing in on a narrower search space.  This is the 
modularity solution. Each module is internally a serial machine and still performing local computation but 
this architecture makes for an overall system that is not generalist.  In other words, the overall machine has 
a bespoke architecture that reflects the variety of problem spaces it will encounter, and at each such space 
the relevant modules switch on and perform the necessary serial computations for the appropriate input-
output function.  SBEP argues that, in nature, such bespoke tailoring can only be carried out by natural 
selection, which is a version of assumption 1.  (For alternative views on ontogenetic tailoring, see Dickins 
and Levy, 2001; Elman et al., 1996; and Quartz and Sejnowski, 1997.) 
It is worth noting that the frame-problem makes content a prime focus – modules are contentful, 
allowing the system to zero-in on the appropriate set of hypotheses to help solve a problem.  As outlined 
above content is also a prime focus for a Chomskyan perspective within SBEP, but SBEP also appears to 
argue for computational specificity.  None the less, one might expect a contentful module to have its own 
dedicated processing system too. 
Fodor (2000) notes that a massively modular mind could only successfully avoid the frame 
problem if the appropriate modules were activated when a given problem space was encountered.  Fodor 
looks at a number of ways of activating a massively modular mind that runs on CTM principles.  For 
instance, one could have a set of modules that translated input into the appropriate form of representations 
to then be fed into the relevant higher-order module.  So, a cheat detection module would be fed with 
representations of social contracts, which had been extracted from the input received, and this module 
would discern whether or not the contracts were being violated.  But what process governs the arrangement 
of input into representations that can then be fed onto relevant higher order modules?  As a strong 
massively modular theorist one would have to propose another set of modules and this would begin the 
12
decline into an infinite regress.  In short there seems no way around falling into this kind of regress if one 
rigorously adheres to the defining principle that all is modular.  If one does not, and instead takes a weaker 
form, then one can build in some order of domain-general thinking system that can augment some 
modularity.  But a domain-general system that can take input, and infer which module to activate in order 
to produce a relevant response, is one that is subject to the frame problem.  Fodor concludes that we are 
forced to take some version of domain-general CTM and accept that it is explanatorily inadequate in the 
face of the frame problem.  So, we could envisage a mind with a good deal of modularity that is supported 
by a domain-general computational system.  However, invoking domain generality at any stage in this 
argument for modular architecture considerably weakens this architectural hypothesis, as it re-introduces 
the frame problem. 
As we have seen, SBEP argues for weak massive modularity and this introduces some domain-
generality into the proceedings.  It would further appear from the initial quotation from Tooby and 
Cosmides (p. X) that this generality is a computational trait, not a content-trait.  Given the argument from 
the AI field we can see that this domain-general computational capacity has to account for global cognition 
and get around the frame problem. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 105–106) do use the above arguments from AI to support their 
claims: 
 
It is the perennial hope of SSSM advocates within the psychological community that some new technology or 
architecture (wax impressions, telephone switching, digital computers, symbol-processing, recursive 
programming languages, holograms, non-von Neumann architectures, parallel distributed processing – a new 
candidate every decade or so), will free them to return to empiricism, associationism, domain-generality and 
content-independence (where SSSM tells them they should go).  Never the less, the functional necessity of 
content-specificity emerges in every technology because it is a logical inevitability.  Most recently, researchers 
are establishing this all over again with connectionism…. the frame problem (is an obstacle) that can only be 
overcome by endowing computational architectures with contentful structure.  This is because the world itself 
provides no framework that can decide among the infinite number of potential category dimensions, the infinite 
number of relations, and the infinite number of potential hypotheses that could be useful to analyse it. (Italics 
added.) 
 
13
This is clearly not an argument from evolutionary theory.  It would appear that SBEP holds the view that 
modularity is a solution to a problem suffered by serial-computational systems and that we can look for the 
domains of our modules through an evolutionarily inspired functional decomposition.  This assumes that 
functional decomposition at the behavioural level matches functional organisation at the cognitive level. In 
other words, there is an assumption that an extensional description of behaviour will inform us about the 
organisation of our mental contents and associated computations.  This amounts to a stronger version of my 
first assumption, which could now be read as: 
 
1.1 Cognition has to be organised in a domain-specific fashion and the only way that 
organisation could have been instantiated is through natural selection 
 
The evolutionary analysis provides a description of the domains. However, there is still support for 
assumption 3, which is not incompatible with assumption 1.1. 
 
Adaptive Behaviour and Direct Cognitive Control 
 
Natural selection permits the evolution of only certain strategies for engaging in social exchange.  To be 
selected for, a design governing reasoning must embody one of these strategies – in other words, it must meet 
an “evolvability criterion”….  (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992:170) 
 
SBEP makes explicit reference to game-theoretic analyses of the emergence of certain strategies.  In 
particular, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) discuss the classic work on one-shot and iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games that were used to model the emergence of various evolutionarily stable strategies.  
Evolutionarily stable strategies are defined as those strategies that, once in place, cannot be supplanted by 
another.  This claim is not the claim that other strategies will not exist alongside the evolutionarily stable 
strategy, but simply that any other strategy cannot beat it, given the defined constraints of the evolutionary 
game being played.  Thus an evolutionarily stable strategy is an optimal strategy, given these constraints.  
Within behavioural ecology, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology it is important to note that the 
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strategy part of the term refers to behaviour, not to a derived plan.  Such strategies do not necessarily come 
under the control of conscious or deliberative systems. 
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) look at the canonical game-theoretic work of Axelrod, Hamilton and 
Trivers in the domain of reciprocal altruism. They argue that reciprocity must be underpinned by “cognitive 
programs that actually evolved in the human lineage” (1992: 176-177) and this is tantamount to an 
endorsement of assumption 3.  As discussed above, the uncovering of such programs is seen as an 
empirical question and this question has its focus narrowed by paying attention to the nature of the 
evolutionarily stable strategy in question.  So, the claim is that only certain evolutionarily stable strategies 
can emerge in a given niche.  Those cognitive mechanisms that allow the production of these strategies will 
be selected for.  The level of cognitive internalism inherent within this hypothesis is held to be tenable for 
reasons relating to a commitment to CTM and the frame problem argument.  It is regarded as 
computationally intractable for a domain-general architecture to arrive at an evolutionarily stable strategy, 
given the vast number of potential behavioural hypotheses it could generate for any niche.  Accordingly, 
adaptive behaviour has to come under direct cognitive control.  However, as Grantham and Nichols (1999: 
60) point out: 
 
(S)ome adaptive problems don’t even require a cognitive solution.  For some animals, the adaptive problems of 
predator-avoidance and aggression-deterrence are solved by physiological features.  And in humans, it’s 
possible that the adaptive problem of attracting potential (mates) was solved by physiological features. 
 
It is perfectly possible that some of our adaptive problems were cognitively solved, and others were not, but 
which were and which were not is in itself an empirical question.  It might be the case, for example, that the 
evolutionarily stable strategies outlined in the work on reciprocal altruism are implemented not by specific 
algorithms but by simpler associative learning mechanisms.  Furthermore, in line with the assumptions of 
Turing computability, Grantham and Nichols (1999) point out that “each of these … behavioural solutions 
can be cognitively realised in a multitude of ways”, which is the problem of multiple-realisation that allows 
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for a given function to be carried out by multiple lower-level mechanisms.  Evolutionary theory will not 
help us to decide between which of the possible realisations has been instantiated2.
There is a related problem.  As implied, the emergence of the tit-for-tat strategy in the iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game could arguably depend only upon an organism with the ability to register reward 
and punishment, and the ability to associate those things with salient contingencies.  The innate architecture 
required would be sensitivity to the tokens used in the game as rewards or punishments; beyond this the 
recurrent structure of the world, i.e. the constraints and basic learning skills (which are importantly domain-
general) would be sufficient to produce tit-for-tat.  Indeed, we might be happier explaining the reciprocal 
altruism we see in vampire bats in these sorts of terms rather than in complex Marrian ones.  Obviously 
those organisms that learn better (quicker, more accurately) will be favoured and this will have an effect 
upon relative gene frequencies too – but not upon specific genes for specific behaviours, because there are 
no such genes in this scenario and no such devoted behaviour production mechanisms either.  How could 
an evolutionary argument of the order proposed by SBEP help us to decide this issue?   
It must be remembered that the above arguments are all about the general lessons that SBEP seeks 
to draw about doing evolutionary cognitive science.  It may well be the case that the constraints on human 
reciprocal altruism have been unchanging for sufficient time to allow natural selection to winnow away at 
the variance in behaviours such that there are very few strategies open to us.  This is an open question.  The 
answer to this question of the limits on strategic availability does not entail a specific cognitive argument, 
for that too is an open question.  All told, for every behaviour we have to carefully look to the intricacies of 
the case and answer these questions – there is no overall epistemological blueprint to follow save always 
asking them and not being surprised if each case varies significantly.  It is also critically important to 
realise that the SBEP position does not boil down to a finessed evolutionary argument at all, but to a 
specific cognitive position about the nature of cognition, the frame problem and the notion of direct 
cognitive control of adaptations.  All of these assumptions are questionable and quite possibly wrong.  
None of these questions can be answered by evolutionary theory, because all this can tell us about is the 
optimality or not of a given behaviour, and none can be directly tackled by data about behaviour, for these 
 
2 As Grantham and Nichols (1999: 60) point out Cosmides and Tooby do concede this point, which makes their commitment to this 
program unusual. 
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very assumptions are about the production of that self-same behaviour.  The extensional description will 
not tell us about the intensional mechanism. 
If this bleak conclusion is true, then what of the role of evolutionary theory within the cognitive 
sciences?  
 
Some Concluding Comments on Parsimony 
Lurking in the above discussion is the idea that the recurrent structure of the world might actually play 
more of a guiding role in the production of behaviour than previously thought by SBEP theorists.  This 
argument has been clearly made elsewhere (Ariew, 1999; Cummins and Cummins, 2000) in terms of the 
role of canalisation.  Canalisation models assume less innate structure as a result of evolution than SBEP 
and argue that this innate structure forces certain behavioural outcomes by delimiting possibilities given 
recurrent structure.  Such models can rely upon domain-general learning processes as well as innate 
structure. 
Recent cognitivists (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) have taken similar canalisation positions and 
discussed ontogeny as an interaction between minimal innate constraints and recurrent external structure 
leading to a modularised mind. Such modularity is very different from Darwinian modularity and is 
tantamount to the claim that humans are capable of developing specific behavioural skills and the 
underlying cognitive control of them.  What is more, this literature is steeped in a connectionist view of 
cognitive processing rather than a CTM one (cf. Elman, 1993; Elman et al., 1996). 
It would be very easy to lapse into assumptions about just how much recurrent external structure is 
required to produce a given trait, and just how much innate constraining will force a connectionist 
architecture to pump out appropriate behaviour, in much the same way as SBEP has simply assumed no 
role for recurrent external structure other than as the adaptive niche in which the organism in question finds 
itself.  For SBEP all that counts is the degree of truth contingency between the innate internal cognitive 
economy of the organism and the recurrent external structure.  Just so long as the latter is represented in its 
entirety by the former, then all is well.  But it is perhaps this very issue that evolutionary theory can help us 
decide upon – not upon what the exact nature of the internal cognitive architecture is, but upon what degree 
of innate structure is minimally required. 
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To put this another way, we can use evolutionary theory to impose theoretical parsimony upon our 
cognitive speculations.  This is, of course, already being done in the form of computational modelling 
work, perhaps most notably in the field of language origins (for examples see Knight, Studdert-Kennedy 
and Hurford, 2000) and also evolutionary robotics (see Hendriks-Jansen, 1996, and Nolfi and Floreano, 
2000).  The crucial difference between this approach and that of SBEP-style theorists is that what are being 
modelled is putative phylogenies, that do not have to be “true”, in order to produce minimal cognitive 
architectures to perform a given function.  In the order of approach discussed so far in this paper, 
evolutionary theory has taken on a top-down role in terms of supporting core assumptions about how minds 
must look.  As we have seen these assumptions are questionable.  Evolutionary modelling, from the bottom 
up allows a more empirical test of assumptions in terms of producing the most parsimonious model 
possible.  By reducing the number of starting constraints in a modelled agent we can see just how well this 
agent fares in an adaptive problem space and see just how much structure we need to add to improve 
performance.  The nature of the structure – connectionist or serial computational – is down to the pre-
theoretical biases of the researchers to some large extent, although it might be possible to begin thinking 
about the emergence of such architectures over evolutionary time too.  For now, such architectures can be 
pitted against one another to see which can produce the more parsimonious account. 
The use of parsimony is perhaps best seen as a post hoc extra-theoretical commitment within 
science, a commitment that is not always applied (Boyd, 1991).  It is used to help decide between theories 
that explain the same data equally well and that fit the general metaphysical assumptions abroad at the 
time.  Within the biological and cognitive sciences it is not the case that organism in question will be the 
optimum design, and hence most parsimonious, as it will be the result of an evolutionary history of optimal 
design “decisions”.  The application of parsimony to decide between two possible theories cannot be 
performed, then, without a view on the possible phylogenetic histories of each model. It is at this point that 
more standard applications of parsimony might be useful, at the point of deciding between assumptions 
about the evolutionary economics that governed both the establishment of an adaptive problem and the 
abilities of the organism in question before the selection event.  This use of parsimony and the 
establishment of an appropriate metric to so do presents a hard problem and one that I cannot pretend to 
have an answer for.  
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Summary 
This paper has argued that the architectural commitments of SBEP are in large part the product of a specific 
commitment to the computational theory of mind.  Furthermore, the paper has shown how this and related 
positions are questionable.  More crucially than this, the paper has argued that there is nothing in 
evolutionary theory that will help us to decide between views on computation and cognition.  More 
positively, I have suggested that perhaps evolutionary considerations can be used as a parsimonious guide 
to theory building and perhaps can aid us in decisions about the appropriate strength of our commitment to 
nativism, but this in itself is a difficult problem that requires work. 
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